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Deconstruction
Deconstruction: a theory of criticism (usually of literature or film) 
that seeks to expose deep-seated contradictions in a work by 
delving below its surface meaning.
Jacques Derrida 
(1930-2004)
In the context of physical construction, deconstruction 
is the selective dismantlement of building components.
To disassemble something, in 
order to understand what it is 
“made of” and how it works.
Issue: What are the assumptions 
behind (patient) safety?
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Excavating through the layers of safety
Phenomenology
Aetiology
Ontology
The nature and essential characteristics of safety. 
The ‘firstness’ of safety.
The origin or causes of the observable phenomena. 
The safety genotype.
The observable characteristics (of safety). 
The safety phenotype.
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The phenomenology of safety (injury)
US AHQR (Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality)
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization)
Safety is typically defined as the absence of adverse outcomes, or as the freedom 
from unacceptable risks.  
‘freedom from accidental injury’ 
‘avoiding injuries or harm to patients from care 
that is intended to help them.’ 
‘the state in which the risk of harm to persons or 
of property damage is reduced to, and maintained 
at or below, an acceptable level through a 
continuing process of hazard identification and 
risk management.’
Phenomenology
Aetiology
Ontology
A higher level of safety means a smaller number of adverse outcomes, and vice versa.
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The particularistic (reactive) view
Ensuring patient safety “involves the 
establishment of operational systems and 
processes that minimize the likelihood of errors 
and maximizes the likelihood of intercepting 
them when they occur.”
Safety is defined by its phenomenology, i.e., by 
what it is possible to measure.
Patient Safety Indicators are defined as ‘a set of measures (of) adverse events 
that patients experience as a result of exposure to the health care system.’ 
Set of 
possible
measurements
Definition 
of safety
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The aetiology of safety (causality)
Adverse outcomes (accidents, incidents) happen because something goes wrong. 
Adverse outcomes have causes, which can be found and treated.
Phenomenology
Aetiology
Ontology
Accidents are prevented by finding and 
eliminating possible causes. 
Accidents are the (natural) 
culmination of a series of events or 
circumstances, which occur in a 
specific and recognisable order. 
Accidents are prevented by 
strengthening barriers and defences. 
Accidents result from a combination of 
active failures (unsafe acts) and 
latent conditions (hazards). 
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“Human error” as an easy explanation
Infusion Pump and Parenteral Delivery Problems Harvard 
Adverse Drug Event Study. (Leape et al, 1995)
4% errors in 
equipment use
Calibration error due to 
design – no feedback
Tube spontaneously 
disconnected
Hard to distinguish between 
central and peripheral tubes
“… error is the result of an alignment of conditions 
and occurrences each of which is necessary, but none 
alone sufficient to cause the error”.
(Bogner, 1998)
Incident
Error 
provoking 
condition
Alignment 
of factors
Human error in pump 
calibration
Tube unintentionally 
disconnected
Confusion between central 
and peripheral tubes
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Linear cause-effect thinking
Starting from 
the effect, you 
can reason 
backwards to 
find the cause
Starting 
from the 
cause, you 
can reason 
forwards to 
find the 
effect
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The ontology of safety (bimodality)
When tracing adverse outcomes back to their underlying causes, it is assumed that 
the “components” either have functioned correctly or have failed.
Phenomenology
Aetiology
Ontology
Human actions that fail are called “human errors”.
In the technical world, things usually function until 
they fail. When simple systems, such as a 
light bulb, fail, they are discarded and 
replaced by a new (and identical) one.
e ∈ E, e = 1: component or system functions 0: component or system fails 
Performance is bimodal: 
things either work correctly (as 
designed) or they fail.
Performance 
norm
Failure
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Nature of technical (formal) systems
They can be described 
bottom-up in terms of 
components and subsystems.
Risks and failures can 
therefore be analysed 
relative to individual 
components and events.
Decomposition works for 
technical systems, because 
they have been designed.
Output (effects) are proportional to input (causes) and predictable from knowledge of 
the components. Technical systems are linear and event outcomes are tractable. 
Many 
systems are 
identical
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A
B
Today’s systems are socio-technical
Risks cannot be assigned to identifiable parts of the 
systems’ structure. Risks must be seen in relation to the systems’ functions.
The conditions for 
successful functioning are 
created by the interaction 
between social and 
technical factors. 
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Nature of socio-technical systems
Must be described top-
down in terms of 
functions and objectives.
Risks and failures must 
therefore be described 
relative to functional wholes.
Decomposition does not work 
for socio-technical systems, 
because they are emergent.
Complex relations between input (causes) and output (effects) give rise to 
unexpected and disproportionate consequences. Socio-technical systems are 
non-linear and event outcomes are intractable. 
All systems 
unique
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Socio-technical system are not bimodal
Low 
limit
Humans and social systems are not bimodal. 
Normal performance is variable  and this  – rather 
than failures and ‘errors’ – is why accidents 
happen. Since performance shortfalls are not a 
simple (additive or proportional) result of the 
variability, more powerful, non-linear models are 
needed.
Performance 
norm
Performance variations can be have 
positive as well as negative outcomes!
But human factors has tended to 
look for negative aspects of 
performance - deviations or “errors”
Time
Distance 
from “norm”
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Tractable and intractable systems
Principles of functioning 
are known
System does not change 
while being described
Description are simple 
with few details
Tractable system
(independent, clockwork)
Intractable system
(interdependent, teamwork)
Principles of functioning 
are  partly unknown
System changes before 
description is completed
Description are elaborate 
with many details
Comprehensibility
Underspecified
Stability
Complicacy
Fully specified Partly specified
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The ontology of safety (variability)
Phenomenology
Aetiology
Ontology
Systems are so complex that work situations always are underspecified – hence 
partly unpredictable
Few things can be done unless procedures and tools are adapted to the situation. 
Performance variability is both normal and necessary.
Individuals, groups, and organisations must 
adjust their performance to meet existing 
conditions (resources and requirements). 
Most socio-technical systems are 
intractable;  work conditions therefore differ 
from what has been specified or prescribed.
Because resources (time, information, etc.)  
are finite, such adjustments will always be 
approximate rather than exact. 
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Failures or successes?
Who or what are responsible 
for the remaining 10-20%?
When something goes right, 
e.g., 9.999 events out of 
10.000, are humans also 
responsible in 80-90% of 
the cases?
When something goes wrong, 
e.g., 1 event out of 10.000 
(10E-4), humans are assumed 
to be responsible in 80-90% of 
the cases.
Who or what are 
responsible for the 
remaining 10-20%?
Investigation of failures is 
accepted as important.
Investigation of successes 
is rarely undertaken.
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The aetiology of safety (emergence)
Phenomenology
Aetiology
Ontology
CertificationI
P
C
O
R
T
FAA
LubricationI
P
C
O
R
T
Mechanics
High workload
Grease
Maintenance 
oversightI
P
C
O
R
T
Interval approvals
Horizontal 
stabilizer 
movement
I
P
C
O
R
T
Jackscrew 
up-down 
movement
I
P
C
O
R
T
Expertise
Controlled
stabilizer
movement
Aircraft 
designI
P
C
O
R
T
Aircraft design knowledge
Aircraft pitch 
controlI
P
C
O
R
T
Limiting 
stabilizer 
movement
I
P
C
O
R
T
Limited
stabilizer
movement
Aircraft
Lubrication
End-play 
checkingI
P
C
O
R
T
Allowable
end-play
Jackscrew 
replacementI
P
C
O
R
T
Excessive
end-play
High workload
Equipment Expertise
Interval approvals
Redundant
design
Procedures
Procedures
While some adverse events can be attributed to a breakdown or malfunctioning of 
components and normal system functions, many cannot. These events are better  
understood as the result of unexpected combinations of performance variability. 
Accidents result from unexpected combinations 
(resonance) of variability of normal performance. 
Safety is achieved by controlling variability 
(monitoring and damping). 
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Why only look at what goes wrong?
Focus is on what goes 
wrong. Look for failures 
and malfunctions. Try to 
eliminate causes and  
improve barriers.
Focus is on what goes 
right. Use that to 
understand  normal 
performance, to do 
better and to be safer.
Safety = Reduced 
number of adverse 
events.
10-4 := 1 failure in 
10.000 events
1 - 10-4 := 9.999 non-
failures in 10.000 events
Safety and core 
business help each other. 
Learning uses most of 
the data available
Safety and core 
business compete for 
resources. Learning only 
uses a fraction of the 
data available
Safety = Ability to 
succeed under varying 
conditions.
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Normal outcomes
(things that go 
right)
Serendipity
Very high
Predictability
Range of event outcomes
Outcome 
Very low
Po
si
ti
ve
Ne
ga
ti
v e
Ne
ut
ra
l
Disasters
Near misses
Accidents
Incidents
Good luck
Mishaps 
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Normal outcomes
(things that go 
right)
Serendipity
Very high Predictability
Frequency of event outcomes
Outcome 
Very low
Po
si
ti
ve
Ne
ga
ti
v e
Ne
ut
ra
l
Disasters
Accidents
Good luck
Mishaps 
Incidents
Near misses
102
104
106
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Normal outcomes
(things that go 
right)
Serendipity
Very high Predictability
Being safe versus being unsafe
Outcome 
Very low
Po
si
ti
ve
Ne
ga
ti
v e
Ne
ut
ra
l
Disasters
Accidents
Good luck
Mishaps 
Incidents
Near misses
102
104
106
Safe 
Functioning
(invisible)
Unsafe 
Fun tioning
(visible)
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Things that go right
From the negative to the positive
Things that go wrong
Safety = Reduced 
number of adverse 
events.
Eliminate failures 
and malfunctions as 
far as possible.
Safety = Ability to 
respond when 
something fails. 
Improve ability to 
respond to adverse 
events.
Safety = Ability to 
succeed under 
varying conditions. 
Improve resilience.
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The phenomenology of safety (successes)
“Safety is a dynamic non-event” (Karl Weick)
Safety is a dynamic event
There is an absence of failures (things that go 
wrong), but as a result of active engagement.
But if safety is a non-event, it can neither be 
observed., no measured
There is a presence of successes (things that go 
right), and the more there are, the safer the 
system is.
If safety is something that happens, rather than 
something that does not happen, then it can be 
observed – and measured.
Phenomenology
Aetiology
Ontology
In order to ensure that a system is safe, we need to understand how it succeeds 
rather than how it fails.
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If thoroughness dominates, 
there may be too little time 
to carry out the actions.
If efficiency dominates, 
actions may be badly 
prepared or wrong
Neglect pending actions
Miss new events
Miss pre-conditions
Look for expected results
Thoroughness: Time to think
Recognising situation.
Choosing and planning.
Efficiency: Time to do
Implementing plans. 
Executing actions.
Efficiency-Thoroughness Trade-Off
Time & resources needed
Time & resources available
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No time (or resources) to do it now
Some ETTO heuristics
Looks fine
Not really important
Normally OK, no need to check
Will be checked by someone else
Can’t remember how to do it 
We always do it this way
Idiosyncratic 
(work related)
Has been checked by someone else 
Cognitive 
(individual)
Judgement under 
uncertainty
Cognitive primitives 
(SM – FG)
Reactions to 
information input 
overload and 
underload
Cognitive style
Collective 
(organisation)
Negative reporting
Reduce 
redundancy
Meet “production” 
targets
Reduce 
unnecessary cost
Double-bind
We must get this done
Must be ready in time
Must not use too much of X
I’ve done it millions of time before
This way is much quicker
It looks like X (so it probably is X)
Reject conflicting 
information
Confirmation bias
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Thoroughness takes time
“In splitting a board, a circular-saw operator 
suffered the loss of his thumb when, in violation of 
instructions, he pushed the board past the saw with 
his fingers, instead of using the push stick that had 
been provided for the purpose.”
“He stated that he had always done such work in this 
manner and had never before been hurt. He had performed 
similar operations on an average of twenty times a day 
for three months and had therefore exposed his hand in 
this way over one thousand five hundred times.”
(Heinrich, 1931 “Industrial accident prevention”)
Grab 
board
Put on 
saw table
Grab push 
stick
Put on 
board
Push past 
saw
Remove 
push stick
Remove 
board
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Efficiency-Thoroughness Trade-Off
One way of managing 
time and resource limitations is to 
think only one step back and/or one step ahead. 
Confirm that 
input is correct Thoroughness 
Efficiency 
Trust that input 
is correct
Consider secondary 
outcomes and side-
effects
Assume  someone 
else takes care of 
outcomes
For distributed work it is necessary to trust what 
others do; it is impossible 
to check everything.
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Handling a drug prescription
Thoroughness
Register prescription in computer 
system by drug name before fetching 
drug from supply.
Efficiency
Avoid letting customer wait by fetching  
drug from supply, and registering it 
later.
On a cold January afternoon, a customer handed in a 
prescription at a drug store. Workload was high due to 
illness among staff, many customers (20-30) were 
waiting (30-40 minutes), and there was only one 
computer terminal available. 
Customer received the wrong drug (Estradiol instead of Efedrin), but the 
mistake was realised before drug was used …
and the pharmacist was blamed for not following procedures.
Verify drug and dose via customer 
dialogue.
Customer was irritated because of long 
wait and declined. 
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Different views of safety management
Things that 
go wrong
Things that 
go right
Safe
Un
sa
fe
The goal is to 
increase the number 
of things that go 
right.
The goal is to reduce 
the number of things 
that go wrong.
Definition of safetyDefinition of safety
Synergistic to quality 
and efficiency
Antagonistic to 
quality and efficiency
“Meaningful” indicatorsMeaningful indicators
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Conclusions: The Way Ahead
Things go right and things go wrong for the same reasons. Efficiency-
thoroughness trade-offs are both normal and necessary.
In the vast majority of cases, the outcome is a success (outcome is 
as expected). This is taken for granted and therefore rarely analysed 
or investigated.
Exceptionally, the outcome is a failure (outcome is not as expected). 
If the consequences are serious (loss of time, material, money or life), 
the event is investigated to find the cause.
Safety is achieved by doing things right, not by avoiding doing things wrong
The reconstruction of safety: 
Variability of normal performance is controlled rather than constrained.
Understand what motivates performance variability and what facilitates it.
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Tack för er 
uppmärksamhet
Tak for jeres 
opmærksomhed
Kiitoksia 
mielenkiinnosta
Takk for 
oppmerksomheten
Thanks for your 
attention
Frågor? Spørgsmål? Spørsmål? Kysymykset?
